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The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in
the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970
Arua Oko Omaka
McMaster University, Canada
Abstract: The Nigeria-Biafra War attracted enormous international
attention not just for the brutal events of the period, but also because of
how the conflict was interpreted, especially by foreigners. The ghastly
images of victims of the war dominated the international media and
roused the world’s conscience. The conflict took a toll on human
lives on both the Igbo and the ethnic minorities in Biafra. While the
Igbo tragedy was largely perpetrated in Northern Nigeria, that of the
Biafran minorities – Efik, Ijaw, Ogoja, Ibibio – occurred mainly in their
homelands. The gory experiences suﬀered by the Biafran minorities
have largely been neglected in the historiography of the Biafra War.
This paper examines the experiences of the ethnic minorities in Biafra
during the war between July 1967 and January 1970. It argues that the
minorities suﬀered a high degree of persecution, molestation, injustice,
psychological torture and other forms of suﬀering which have not been
fully examined in existing literature. The war subjected them to layers
of loyalty and disloyalty both to the federal authority and the Biafran
government. The paper asserts that these minority groups in Biafra
were as much victims of the war as the Igbo. Hence, they should be
accorded due recognition in the historiography of victimhood in the
Nigeria-Biafra War.
Keywords: Biafra; Ethnic; Igbo; Massacre; Minorities; Nigeria; Victims;
War.

Introduction
The idea of “minority” is a concept that has posed some definitional problems
among scholars. Owing to the fluidity of the concept, there has not been any
internationally accepted definition. The earliest attempt to provide a definition for
the term was made in 1977 by Francesco Capotorti, the former Special Rapporteur
of the United Nations, who defined minority as:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in
a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State
– possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics diﬀering from
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense
of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions,
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religion or language.1
The problem with this definition is that it only covers persons belonging to ethnic,
religious, or linguistic minorities. There is no provision for other minority groups
in terms of diﬀerent social categories grounded in sexuality, gender, age, class,
race, etc.
Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted in
1992 recognizes minorities as a group of people with similar national or ethnic,
cultural, religious, and linguistic identity, and provides that states should protect
their existence.2 The article makes reference to the same groups already identified
by Capotorti. But other groups such as sexual minorities, gender minorities, age
minorities, and other minorities who also need rights, are omitted and consequently
appear voiceless and unprotected. With the rapidity of socio-cultural, political,
and economic changes taking place all over the world, the concept of minority
continues to pose more questions than can easily be answered. A more workable
definition of minority should thus be seen in terms of context. Based on this, I
define minority quite broadly as any group of people that is disadvantaged when
compared to the rest of the population. The “minoritization” of a group should
therefore be seen in terms of the situation and not just numerical weakness. For
instance, a group can be a majority in terms of numerical strength but a minority in
terms of political representation. In this situation, the group sees itself as a political
minority and agitates for equality and justice. The minorities referred to in this
paper are the ethnic minorities in Nigeria, and they are minorities because of both
their numerical weakness and poor representation in the national politics.

The Igbo Victims
The Nigeria-Biafra War started on July 6, 1967 and ended on January 15, 1970.
The former Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from Nigeria and declared its
independence on May 30, 1967, following the massacre of the Igbo people who
were living in the northern parts of Nigeria. The federal government of Nigeria
responded to the secession with “police action,” that is, a partial military operation
designed to crush what it perceived as a rebellion. These actions were the beginning
of a war that lasted about thirty months. But what was originally interpreted as a
1
Francesco Capotorti quoted in Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), “Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance
for Implementation” HR/PUB/10/3, accessed August 5, 2012, http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf, 2.
2
OHCHR, “Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities Adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of December
18, 1992,” accessed February 28, 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
MinorityRights en.pdf.
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domestic conflict later took on an international dimension as state and non-state
actors like Britain, the USSR, France, the Red Cross, and the World Council of
Churches became involved in the conflict. The war received one of the highest
humanitarian interventions in recent history. The massive number of children and
women facing starvation attracted the attention of groups like the World Council
of Churches, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Caritas Internationalis,
Interreligious Aﬀairs for the American Jewish Committee, and UNICEF.3 The
relief eﬀort resulted in unusual Jewish-Christian co-operation.4 Countries like
the United States, Germany, France, and the Nordic Countries made enormous
contributions towards the relief eﬀort.5 The international media also highlighted
the humanitarian crisis in the war-torn region and successfully brought this part
of the world into global focus. The New York Times, The London Times, La Stampa of
Italy, and Le Monde of France were some of the newspapers that eﬀectively covered
the war.
The dominant argument in the historiography of the Nigeria-Biafra War,
both within academia and the popular media, is that the Igbo were targeted
for extermination by the Muslim north. A year before the war, during the 1966
massacres of Easterners in Northern Nigeria, the alleged indiscriminate bombing
of civilian targets and the widespread hunger in secessionist Biafra did a lot to
rouse the world’s conscience to the humanitarian crisis facing Biafran peoples.
The international media played a significant role in exposing the humanitarian
tragedies, especially in the Igbo-speaking parts of Biafra. And many years after the
war, scholarly accounts of the war, mostly by scholars from the Igbo-speaking parts
of Baifra, have privileged insights into some of the most hideous acts unleashed
on Biafrans during the war. Yet, not much has been reported about the atrocities
perpetrated against the minorities in Biafra, both by the Nigerian military forces
and the Biafran militias. This is a gap in Biafra’s history.
Newsweek, in one of its reports titled “The Resurrection of Biafra,” stated that
“some of the worst massacres of the war, in fact, occurred when federal troops
captured minority regions -whereupon the minority tribesmen turned on the Ibos
in bloody fury.”6 This quote presents the Igbo as the victims in the hands of the
minority groups, without reference to any experience the minorities might have
3
National Archives Enugu (NAE) MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/
Biafra Relief, Summer Edition, 1968.
4
NAE, MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/Biafra Relief, Summer Edition,
1968.
5
The Nordic countries comprise of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden and
their associated territories, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Svalbard, and Åland Islands.
6
“The Resurrection of Biafra,” Newsweek, March 24, 1969. Ibo refers to the same group as
Igbo. Ibo was commonly used in colonial writings.
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had in the Igbo-dominated region before the arrival of the federal troops. Another
report claimed that “in some areas outside the East which were temporarily held
by Biafran forces, as in Benin and the Mid-Western Region, Ibos were killed by
the local people with at least the acquiescence of the federal force: about 1,000 Ibo
civilians perished at Benin in this way.”7 Nigerian troops were said to have hunted
and killed Igbo males above the age of five, leaving the impression that the war was
waged in a genocidal spirit.8 Colin Legum, a Commonwealth correspondent for
The Observer, London, also noted that “the worst killing occurring among the Ibos
has come from the struggle itself that inevitably produced conditions of famine.”9
Peter Enahoro, who seemed to have sympathised with Biafra wrote: “The Ibos are
bearing the burden that rightly belongs to all who sought progress for Nigeria.”10
Gordon Wainman, a volunteer for the Canadian University Service Overseas at
Kurra Falls in Nigeria, reported the massacre of 30,000 Igbos in Northern Nigeria.11
Wainman said that many of those who were killed were either buried in mass
graves or left to rot in the fields with a thin layer of dirt thrown over them to
reduce the stench of the decaying flesh.
While not denying the gruesome atrocities committed against the Igbo during
the Biafra War, there is an error in the representation of the victims of the massacres.
For instance, some of the victims of the 1966 massacre in Northern Nigeria were
members of minority groups but were generally grouped with Igbos. The report
of the G. C. M. Onyiuke-led tribunal clearly shows that many people belonging to
ethnic minority groups in Eastern and Mid-Western Nigeria were victims of the
May 1966 attack perpetrated by Northerners.12 Members of the minority groups
were easily mistaken for Igbos because it was diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between the
two by mere physical appearance. There were no facial marks as could be found
among the Hausa and the Yoruba, and the pattern of dressing, mostly western,
was similar. N. U. Akpan, Secretary of Government, Republic of Biafra, noted:
The killings in North in 1966, particularly those which occurred from
7
Conor Cruise O’Brien, “A Condemned People,” The New York Review ix, no. 11, December
21, 1967.
8
Ibid.
9
Colin Legum, “Nigeria vs. Biafra: On Taking Sides,” Christianity and Crisis: A Christian
Journal of Opinion, xxix, no. 9 (March 26, 1969): 151.
10
Peter Enahoro, “A Night of Deep Waters” Nigeria/Biafra, April 1969. Peter Enahoro was
the brother of late Anthony Enahoro, former Federal Commissioner for Information and
Labour under General Gowon. Peter’s support or sympathy appears to have been with
Biafra.
11
Gordon Wainman, “I had a Ringside Seat at a Nigerian Massacre,” Toronto Daily Star,
December 14, 1968.
12
Report of the Atrocities Tribunal: Appendix B: Eyewitness Accounts of the 1966 Pogrom,
December 1966.
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the end of September, were indiscriminately directed against people
from Eastern Nigeria, known in the North by the generic name of
Yameri...The subsequent attempts in the North to distinguish between
the Ibos and other peoples of Eastern Nigeria came too late to make
any impression on the non-Ibo members of Eastern Nigeria, who now
shared the same fears and dread of the North as the Ibos.13
The indiscriminate killing of members of Eastern Nigeria accounted for the divided
loyalty of the minority leaders. While some supported the Biafran secession, others
felt it was better to remain as Nigerians.

The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in Nigeria
Nigeria, like most African countries, is a multiethnic society with many ethnic
minorities. The ethnic minority groups in Biafra include, but are not limited to
Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw, and are located along the Eastern border and the oil rich
southern coast. They are found in the present-day Cross River, Akwa-Ibom,
Rivers, and Bayelsa States, forming a larger part of the area now known as the
Niger-Delta region. In 1966, they constituted about 40 percent of the population of
Biafra, formerly Eastern Nigeria, while the Igbo made up the remaining 60 percent.
Although these designated minority groups belonged to the Igbo-dominated
Biafra, they still maintained their distinct ethnic identities throughout the war. All
the minority ethnic groups had their separate historical origin, distinct language,
and cultural practices.
Part of the overarching argument about the war is that it was a war of two
majority ethnic groups - the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo.14 This interpretation is
simplistic and available evidence suggests otherwise. It was rather a war between
the minorities and the majorities in Nigeria. The first and second military coups
on January 15 and July 29, 1966 respectively, ushered in a historic moment in the
history of the minorities in Nigeria. The Richard’s Constitution of 1947 created
a faulty regional structure that encouraged regionalism in Nigeria’s postindependence politics. Apart from the fact that one of the regions was large enough
to dominate the other two regions, the political parties in the federation were
regionally oriented with politicians like Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo,
and Ahmadu Bello, depending on ethnic and regional support to achieve national
power. For instance, the NCNC led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, was seen as
an Igbo party while the NPC led by Ahmadu Bello, a Hausa, was considered a
Hausa-Fulani party. The Action Group was called a Yoruba party because its
leader, Obafemi Awolowo, was Yoruba. Within the existing regional structure,
13
14

Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Secession, 1866-1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1972), 152.
Conor Cruise O’Brien, “A Condemned People.”
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minority aspirations were sometimes ignored but could easily be used to promote
party propaganda.15 Leaders of the minority ethnic groups found themselves in
a disadvantaged position in the entire federal political equation. It was against
this background that minority leaders in diﬀerent regions formed movements
that started agitating for the creation of more states where their interests could
be adequately protected. Some of the major movements that were formed before
independence included the Calabar-Ogoja-River (COR) State Movement in the
Eastern Region, the Mid-West State Movement in the Western Region, and the
Middle-Belt State Movement in the Northern Region. These movements were
neither cultural nor national groups but were “situationally” or circumstantially
formed to agitate for minority rights in the larger state. Though not homogenous,
the ethnic minorities were able to form formal structures that represented their
groups, a development that challenges constructivist arguments that the “lack of
pure identities means that groups are not homogenous and cannot be represented
through formal structures.”16
The leaders of these state creation movements believed that the formation
of more states would eliminate their fears of domination by the majority ethnic
groups. This concern led to the setting up of the Minorities Commission by the
colonial authorities in 1957.17 It was evident that state creation would allay the
fears of the minorities and guarantee more stability in the federation, but the
Commission pointed out that if new states were created, they would be given
two years to settle down before independence could be granted to the country.18
As events later revealed, the euphoria of gaining the long awaited independence
blinded the national leaders to other realities. As the domination of the minorities
continued, riots from minority areas like Tiv lingered. The Tiv under the leadership
of Joseph Tarka had agitated for the creation of the Middle-Belt State. The MidWest minorities in the former Western Region formed their own state as a result
of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigeria and
Cameroon (NCNC) plot against the Action Group (AG – a Yoruba-led party). The
Mid-West creation was a way of weakening the influence of the Action Congress
in the Western Region.
The growing agitations of groups dedicated to improving the fortunes of
minorities in Nigeria received a remarkable boost by Nigeria’s first and second
15

NAE (Unclassified document), “Understanding the Nigerian Crisis,” Benin: Department
of International Aﬀairs and Information, Benin, 1968, 5.
16
Stephen May et al., Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 8-9.
17
Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), 242.
18
Nigeria Ministry of Information, The Struggle for One Nigeria (Lagos: Ministry of
Information, 1967), 3.
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coups of the late 1960s. While the first coup dismantled the influence of the
Hausa-Fulani potentates, the second coup dislodged the Igbo from their positions
of military control. These developments altered the balance of power and ethnic
minorities in the army and civil service became central players in Nigerian politics.
General Yakubu Gowon, who is Ngas, a minority ethnic group in the Northern
Region, had Colonel Akahan, a Tiv, as his Chief of Staﬀ. Some commentators
interpreted the new leadership structure as the government of Middle-Belt
minorities that emerged to dominate politics of Northern Nigeria.19 When Lt.
Colonel Joseph Akahan died in a plane crash, some leaders of the Middle-Belt
region accused Northern leaders of masterminding his death.20 Although there
was no evidence linking Akahan’s death to Northern leaders, the ensuing
controversy led to the withdrawal of Tivs from diﬀerent parts of the North to
Tiv land. At the centre of the civil service were minority group members such as
Allison Ayida, Philip Asiodu, and A. A. Atta, who were regarded as the “superpermanent secretaries” because of their influence. People also regarded these
“super-permanent Secretaries” as members of the “Oxford tribe” because they had
received their degrees from Oxford University.21 Ayida and Asiodu, particularly,
belonged to Gowon’s three-member kitchen cabinet.22 Edwin Ogbu, who was a
Permanent Secretary in charge of External Aﬀairs, was equally a minority from the
Middle-Belt. Apart from Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba, some of the commissioners
who largely championed the war politics were of minority ethnic origin. Anthony
Enahoro, Commissioner, Ministry of Information and Okoi Arikpo Commissioner,
Ministry of External Aﬀairs were minority members. There were obviously other
members of Gowon’s cabinet from the majority ethnic groups but those of the
minority ethnic groups appeared to have wielded more influence. The NigeriaBiafra War era was perhaps the first time members of the minority groups could
occupy many important positions in the military, politics, and civil service. The
assistance provided to Gowon by the increased number of minorities in the civil
service and army was critical in the administration’s successful prosecution of the
Nigerian civil war.
The minorities’ ascendancy after the July 1966 coup created an opportunity
for them to address the grievances which they had long expressed through their
movements. The project of state creation came at a time when the country was in a
political stalemate. The coups and countercoups, the massacres of Igbos in diﬀerent
19

Department of State, Telegram, The Death of Akahan, August 1967.
Ibid.
21
John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1977), 26.
22
Ibid., 150.
20
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parts of Nigeria, the failure to implement the Aburi Accord by the Nigerian
government, the declaration of the Republic of Biafra, and the creation of twelve
states by General Gowon worsened the tension between Nigeria and Biafra. It was
a clash of rights, and both General Ojukwu and General Gowon seemed to have
legitimate claims. Biafrans claimed the right to survival while Nigerians claimed
the right to the corporate existence of the country. Two new states were carved out
of the former Eastern Region, leaving it with a total of three states. This seemed to
be a trump card for the federal government to court the minorities and forestall
the Eastern secession. That was obviously the immediate objective but the long
term goal of the minority leaders in state creation was to liberate the minorities
from majority dominance. While the argument in favour of state creation was
ostensibly to ensure stability and national unity, it was no less a struggle of the
minorities against the old dominant majorities in the various regions. Within the
Hausa-Fulani leadership, state creation was considered a dangerous development,
but to the new states like Kwara and Benue-Plateau, it was an opportunity to get
liberated from the Hausa-Fulani hegemony.23 For some of the ethnic minorities in
the former Eastern Region, state creation meant liberation from the alleged Igbo
domination.

Ethnic Minorities as Victims in Biafra
Violent conflicts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War inflict serious injuries and create
victims of all kinds. To the outside world, the known victims of the war were the Igbo
who, apart from being targets of the 1966 massacres, also suﬀered indiscriminate
bombings and monumental starvation that allegedly took about two million lives.
Within the forty-two years since the war ended, more revelations about the war
atrocities on the minorities have emerged. Surviving records and oral histories of
the war suggest that minorities in Biafra became individual and collective victims
of the war. These accounts also reveal how individuals and groups committed
heinous atrocities under the pretext of either fighting a war of survival for Biafra
or a war of national unity for Nigeria.
One recurrent question that comes up about the Biafran minorities is: what
was the attitude of the minorities to the Biafran secession? This cannot be answered
with certainty. While Biafra claimed that the minorities were wholeheartedly in
support of the secession, the federal government maintained that the minorities
had been longing to be liberated.24 Suzanne Cronje, one of the most prolific
journalists on the Biafra war, observed that “the feelings of the minorities were
23
National Archives United Kingdom (NAUK), FCO 38/222, Political Aﬀairs, (Internal)
Demonstration.
24
O’Brien, “A Condemned People.”
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diﬃcult to define.”25 In the first place, the anti-Igbo uprising which would have
come from the minorities as people that needed liberation did not emerge, nor
was there any noticeable form of unrest among the minorities under the Biafran
administration. Loyalties were, in fact, divided. The supporters of the Biafran
secession were those who felt that the Easterners as a group had shared the same
fate as victims of the 1966 massacres and expulsion from the North, while those
who joined the Nigerian government saw it as an opportunity to have a separate
state of their own and be free from any domination. Although the ethnic minorities
had clamoured for a separate state of their own, it was very diﬃcult to determine
what they actually wanted during the war. A plebiscite could have given them an
opportunity to express themselves but the proposal was strongly rejected by the
federal government who felt it would imply a withdrawal of the federal troops to
the prewar boundaries.26
To understand the divergent attitudes of the minorities to the Biafran
secession, an examination of oral histories from people who occupied positions of
authority during the war as well as from ordinary people is necessary. The Ikun in
the present day Cross River State presents a good example of the crimes committed
against the minorities. The Ikun clan is in the Biase Local Government Area of
Cross River State. The people share a common boundary with the Ohafia, an Igbo
clan, in the present day Abia State. When the war broke out, Biafra stationed some
of its troops in the Cross River region, including Ikun. According to a female
survivor-victim of the Biafran occupation, the Ikun initially supported Biafra and
had friendly relations with the soldiers, who were also accommodating. As time
went on, tensions emerged. Some Ikun men were suspected of collaborating with
Nigerian soldiers. This led to arrests, looting, rapes, and other atrocities in Ikun
land.27 William Norris of the London Times who visited Biafra, also reported an eyewitness account in which some men of Ibibio ethnic origin were beaten to death at
Umuahia on April 2, 1968.28 These Ibibios who included old men and young men
were apparently suspected of collaborating with advancing Nigerian troops. They
were reportedly frog-marched across an open space while the local people attacked
them with sticks and clubs.29 Oral testimony by the survivor-victim corroborates
25

Suzanne Cronje, “Two Levels of Truth,” Nigeria/Biafra, April 1969.
U.S. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972,
Document 35.
27
Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles at Amanki Village in Ikun Clan of Biase Local
Government Area, April 14, 1994. Transcript in my custody. The informant is described as
victim-survivor because, she lost her four day old baby and grandmother.
28
Department of State, Telegram, Nigerian Rebel Atrocities, May 1968.
29
Ibid.
26
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this account. According to the eyewitness, Biafran soldiers allegedly took Ikun
men to Ohafia for a meeting but never brought them back. The informant also
alleged that the soldiers returned to the community and rounded up some men
within their reach and shot them. This survivor who lost her four-day old son and
her grandmother seemed to have suspected foul play from the Ohafia people who
share a common boundary with her community. The victimization continued
until the Biafran headquarters likely issued an order that people should not be
killed again.30 By this time, the remaining people had escaped the community,
leaving behind only the soldiers, the Ohafia, and some Ikun who were said to be
of mixed blood - half Ohafia and half Ikun. These remaining groups, according to
the survivor-victim shared the fish ponds, forests, and farms belonging to Ikun
people. 31
In a related account, B. J. Ikpeme, a member of a minority group and retired
Senior Medical Oﬃcer in the then Eastern Region revealed atrocities perpetrated
by Biafran soldiers against the minorities in some towns in the present-day Cross
River and Akwa- Ibom States. Ikpeme argued that Ojukwu’s declaration of the
Republic of Biafra had been issued against the wishes of the majority of the people
of Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers Provinces, who for many years had agitated for a
separate state of their own. According to Ikpeme, the Igbo leadership, who did
not like the minority agitation, decided either to force the five million non-Igbo
minorities into the new republic or eliminate them. It was on this basis, claims
Ikpeme, that Biafran soldiers were quickly sent to the minority areas to “keep down
the people, detain or even kill all who dared raise a voice in protest against the
idea of Biafra.”32 It was during this period that the non-Igbos started experiencing
diﬀerent forms of inhumane treatment, ranging from torture, detention, to killing.
Ikpeme himself was detained in what he described as a “concentration camp” and
was later transferred to a prison cell where he was given urine to drink when he
demanded water.33
Ikpeme described instances where the Biafran soldiers allegedly perpetrated
atrocities against some members of non-Igbo groups. In Asang town in Enyong,
from where Ikpeme originated, about four hundred people were carried away
to an unknown destination. Another town called Attan Onoyon in the same
30

Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles.
Ibid.
32
Presbyterian Church of Canada Archives (hereafter PCCA), “The Secessionist Regime
and the Non-Ibo ‘Minorities’ in the East of Nigeria.” This was a text of statements at the
Peace Talks on the Nigerian Civil War, at Kampala, Uganda. Ikpeme who was a retired
senior medical oﬃcer in the former Eastern Region also served as a member of the Federal
Government delegation at the Kampala Peace Talks.
33
Ibid.
31
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Enyong was burnt down with many people killed by the Biafran soldiers. In Ikot
Ekpenyong in the present day Akwa Ibom State, Biafran soldiers were said to
have shot many villagers. Ikpeme also recounted that similar killings carried out
by Biafran soldiers took place in places like Ikot Okpot and Idoro. He equally
alleged that when the Nigerian troops landed in Calabar on October 18, 1967,
about 169 civilians in detention were lined up and shot by Biafran soldiers. This
same allegation had also been published in The New York Times as an informational
advertisement by the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in New
York.34 These two accounts, given by the survivor-victim of Ikun and Dr. Ikpeme,
portray similar pictures of gross atrocities but with diﬀerent underlying objectives.
Biafra ran a special operations group known as the Biafran Organization
of Freedom Fighter (BOFF). This was a paramilitary organization set up by the
civil defence group in Bende.35 This special operations group was instructed to
suppress the enemy, but they apparently targeted some minorities in Cross River
and Akwa Ibom States on the account of sabotage against the Biafran government.36
Philip Eﬃong, who was from one of the ethnic minorities, probably ordered
the BOFF’s “combing” operations after the death of one Major Achibong. In an
interview, the informant did not reveal the circumstances surrounding the death
of Major Achibong who was equally a member of a minority group. He argued
that if Eﬃong ordered any “combing” operation, it could not have been aimed
at exterminating members of his ethnic group. What the informant’s testimony
reveals is that some members of the BOFF who also operated as the Bende Special
Operations group could have taken advantage of the assignment to accomplish
selfish interests. For instance, an intriguing revelation about the Bende Special
Operations group shows that some of its members decapitated their victims for
ritual purposes.37 Head-hunting in warfare was a cultural practice in some parts
of Biafra known as Old Bende. This tradition survived up to the beginning of the
twentieth century. In the pre-colonial era, it was culturally acceptable for members
of a certain age-grade to go to war and come back with human heads as trophies.
Successful warriors who brought back trophies were highly honoured among
members of their age-grades and in the whole community. The war situation
might have created an opportunity for the warrior group to reactivate a tradition
that had faded out as a result of Western influence.
Although all the minority groups suﬀered diﬀerent forms atrocity, the
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minorities in the Rivers area seemed to be worse oﬀ. Apart from torture and other
forms of human rights abuse, they were also evicted from their homes. For instance,
when two strategic villages on the New Calabar and Sombriero Rivers fell to the
federal troops in February 1968, the news that followed was that the majority
of the soldiers that led the operation were Rivers young men, predominantly
Kalabari. As a consequence, many people from Bakana, one of the major Kalabari
towns, were removed and sent to Igbo towns like Umuahia, Owerri, Abiriba, and
Ozuitem, most likely to avoid further infiltration of the enemies.38 Chief Samuel
Mbakwe, who served as Biafran Provincial Administrator for Okigwe Province,
noted the influx of refugees from Port Harcourt but did not explain whether or
not they were forcibly removed by the Biafran forces.39 We do know that Biafrans
tended to regard anyone who stayed at his post and was overrun by the federal
advance as a collaborator. An Irish priest who served in Rivers State reported
that the Igbo soldiers were suspicious of some Rivers people who sometimes led
federal troops through their lines along hidden creeks.40 This attitude, according
to the priest, created a mixture of panic, fear, and hatred among the Biafran troops
towards some indigenous people of Rivers State. People who were maltreated
were said to have been involved in this act of “sabotage” against Biafra.
At Bolo and Ogu in Okirika, and Onne in Eleme, the villagers suﬀered the
same fate. After the battle at Onne, Biafran troops removed the town inhabitants
suspected to have collaborated with federal troops and sent them to the Rainbow
Town headquarters of the Biafran 52 Brigade in Port Harcourt. Graham-Douglas,
who was also thrown into detention, claimed to have seen about three hundred
men detained in the Rainbow Town. He asserted that no fewer than six thousand
Rivers people were sent to diﬀerent refugee camps in Igboland.41
It is important to point out that propaganda played a prominent role in the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Some of the pamphlets published by Nigeria and Biafra or their
agents were loaded with misinformation. Commenting on a section of GrahamDouglas’ pamphlet titled, Ojukwu’s Rebellion and World Opinion, John Tilney of
Liverpool observed, “That may be propaganda. What Graham-Douglas says may
not be wholly true. But we are all plagued by propaganda by both sides.” 42 Both
Biafra and Nigeria professionally engaged propaganda as a potent tool in the war.
While Biafra hired Markpress, Nigeria engaged the services of Galatzine Chant
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Russell and Partners for the public relations job.43 Graham-Douglas’ story that the
minorities in Biafra had suﬀered more hardships and molestations than the Igbo
could claim to have suﬀered at the hands of Northern Nigerians was apparently
part of Nigeria’s propaganda which he also presented in London in August 1968.44
Graham-Douglas’ comments about Biafra had been criticised by an oﬃcial of the
British High Commission for lack of inside information about Biafra.45 He was
equally described as talking “out of the back of his head” because of unverifiable
comments he made about the Catholic Church.46
J. O. J. Okezie observed that Graham-Douglas’ switch to the Nigerian side
might have led to the Igbo attitude of distrust towards the minorities. He pointed
out however, that the sabotage accusation was not limited to the non-Igbo. The
Onitsha people who were indisputably Igbo also suﬀered the same intimidation
and humiliation. Many of their prominent leaders were said to have been detained
by the Ojukwu-led government for allegedly contributing to the fall of Onitsha
and Enugu.47 A brigadier in the Biafran Army narrated his personal experience in
the sabotage accusation. The oﬃcer stated that two members of a local militia had
written an anonymous petition against him. When the writers were discovered,
they confessed that they had undertaken to cut down his popularity. The two
oﬃcers were brought before Ojukwu by Major General Eﬃong who ordered their
execution. The oﬃcer in his magnanimity refused to execute the petition writers.48
This illustrates how the sabotage syndrome assumed a life of its own and became
an instrument of victimization against innocent persons. There is no doubt that
many people lost their lives without substantial evidence, as is common during
times of war whether in Africa or elsewhere.
Violence towards the minorities was not perpetrated only by the Biafran
troops. The federal troops were equally culpable of this crime. In Andoni area of
Rivers for example, an appeal was sent to the Biafran Head of State narrating how
the villages were attacked on Sunday, March 31, 1968 as a result of their loyalty to
Biafra. The report alleged that the attack was led by five collaborators who were
likely members of the minority group. One of the victims of the attack was said
to be an undergraduate student of the University of Ibadan who was a member
of the Biafran Provincial Enlightenment Committee. Apart from burning down
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houses and property, the petitioners also alleged that over 500 persons including
children were killed. 49 Similarly, approximately 2,000 Efiks were reportedly killed
in Calabar by the federal troops. The victims were said to be returnees who
revolted against the federal occupation. The killing was reported to Gowon who
subsequently appointed Dr. J. B. Ikpeme as Chief Justice when the killing had
nearly been completed.50
The Nigerian Air Force left their own mark in the minorities’ areas. They were
accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilian occupied areas. William Norris of
the London Sunday Times in an article titled, “Nightmare in Biafra,” reported how
the high-flying Russian Ilyushin jets dropped bombs in civilian centres in Biafra.
He stated that,
Slowly, but eﬀectively, a reign of terror has been created. The ruins of
Mary Slessor Memorial Hospital at Itu, of the hospital of Itigidi, and of
the Cheshire Home at Port Harcourt, stand as a kind of grisly memorial
to something that must be if words are to retain any meaning. It is
certainly not war.51
These targets were all in the minority areas. Cronje similarly reported that the
Nigerian Air Force had bombed the minorities as much, if not more than the
Igbos.52
The plight of the minorities had been so alarming that several Nigerian
students of Rivers State origin in London staged a peaceful protest against the
killing and displacement of their people. In addition to a peaceful march from
Trafalgar Square to the House of Commons in London, they also sent out petitions
to the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), His Holiness
Pope Paul VI, Emperor Haile Selaisie, the British Prime Minister and other relevant
groups, asking them to bring pressure on the warring parties to stop the senseless
killing of innocent and defenceless people of Rivers State.53 The petition may not
have produced any direct result but must have contributed to the pressure on the
warring parties to negotiate for peace.
The war had been fought not just for political reasons but also for economic
motives with oil resources in mind. And for a national economy that had begun
to depend on oil, control of the oil-bearing region that was inhabited by the ethnic
minorities became crucial to winning the war. Recent discoveries by the Ministry
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of Defence-sponsored humanitarian demining project buttress the claim that the
oil rich minority areas were hotly contested in the war. Although the war had
ended, people in diﬀerent parts of the then Biafra continued to die from accidental
explosion of unexploded mines. According to Emeka Uhuegbu, the field
administrator of the United Nations mandated demining project, the minority
areas of Rivers State had the highest number of landmine victims. Akwa Ibom and
Imo States follow on the list.54 The demining team discovered 400 unexploded
bombs in a forest in Rivers State. These bombs and landmines had killed several
unsuspecting villagers who went to farm, resulting in the nickname, “evil forest.”55

Conclusion
Brutal conflicts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War inflict painful injuries on all people.
The few cases examined in this article show that the ethnic minorities were also
individually and collectively victimized. Gowon’s creation of new states and
Ojukwu’s declaration of the Republic of Biafra created a sharp division among
ethnic minorities. This meant loyalties and disloyalties to the two warring parties.
Upholding Nigeria’s principle of twelve-state structure meant sabotage to Biafra,
while supporting Biafra’s secession implied rebellion to the Nigerian government.
The minorities in the oil-rich region seemed to have been worse oﬀ in the war. The
warring parties wanted to control the region and its oil resource. It was largely for
this reason that the region assumed strategic importance and became a theatre of
war.
General Gowon’s declaration of “No Victor, No Vanquished” after Biafra’s
capitulation was a good social therapy that helped calm the war tensions among
the groups that were involved in the conflict. Nevertheless, the vestiges of the
war are still present in the minority areas. The unexploded bombs in these highly
contested areas still pose a huge threat. People continue to lose their legs and lives
following accidental explosions. The victims of these accidental explosions are yet
to be given adequate rehabilitation.56
Despite the suﬀerings of the ethnic minorities during and in the aftermath of
the war, their perspective in the civil war discourses remains almost forgotten. Their
victimhood, like that of the Igbo, should be accorded a place in the historiography
of the Nigeria-Biafra War. The struggle for Nigeria’s unity wouldn’t have been
possible without the minorities. The struggle over control of the oil-rich region
placed them in a disadvantaged position by exposing them to more dangers and
54
Emeka Uhegbu, interview by author, July 14, 2011. Field Administrator, Ministry of
Defence-sponsored Humanitarian Demining Project. The project was mandated by the
United Nations Organization under the Ottawa Convention of 2001.
55
Uhegbu, interview by author.
56
Ibid.

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

40 | Omaka
destruction. Recognizing the ethnic minorities as victims would place them in
their rightful position in the nation’s history.
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